(College) The US center of disease control considers the following in ification of biological agentsand toxics according to Efstathiou S, Preston CM (2005), one, hazardous characteristic of the biological agent-that is its capability to infect and cause disease in a susceptible human or animal host, the severity of the disease and the availability of preventive measure and effective treatment of the disease. Two, genetically modified agent hazards-this is the possibility that the genetic modification could increase an agent’s pathogenicity or affect its susceptibility to antibiotics or any other effective treatments. Three, hazardous characteristics of laboratory procedures, this is important as it helps to know to what extent a particular pathogen can cause risk to laboratory staff.
The major classification of biological agents and toxics are: High-priority, Second highest priority and Third highest priority agents with reference to CDC (2005; 54: 537-39). High-priority include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they can; be easily spread or transmitted from person to person; and might cause public panic and social disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness. Examples include, Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), Smallpox (variola major) and Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin) among others.
Second highest priority agents include those that are moderately easy to spread; result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates; and require specific enhancements of CDCs diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance. Examples include Brucellosis (Brucella species) and Food safety threats (e. g., Salmonella species, Escherichia coli O157: H7, Shigella)
Third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of: availability; ease of production and dissemination; and potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact. An example is the emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus and Hantavirus with reference to CDC (2005; 54: 537-39)
National response framework is built upon scalable, flexible and adaptable coordinating structures to align key role and responsibilities across the nation. The private sector performs essential service missions in times of need. They provide shelter, emergency food supplies among other vital services. The framework incorporates standardized organizational structures that promotes on- scene initiative, innovation and sharing of resources and information. The framework promotes quick assessment and response to incidences that require federal assistance.
When dealing with any potential terrorist attack, past occurrence has taught that the first necessary task is to make safe the area and determine the nature and severity of the threat. Particularly in the past few years, several instances have been reported when a secondary device has been targeted at emergency responders or armed secondary assault has been perpetrated by offenders, in an attempt to harm or kill rescuers and disrupt emergency operations.
Deploying countermeasures along pathways to reduce the threat of a terrorist attack is nothing new. The pathway to a commercial airline trip requires one to pass through a Transportation Security Administration screening checkpoint. These checkpoints are designed to reduce the threat of an attack.
Rain concept stresses the need for safe management of biological attack by involving all the necessary institution of the United States. The federal law is put in place to ensure that the rights of the citizens are taken into consideration while dealing with biological threats. There is proper training for first respondent to ensure that the threat is contained as fast as possible in case of attack. The rain concept further advocates for early detection of a threat, quick response, isolation and quarantine of those affected.
Detection of biological attack is difficult since it uses living micro-organisms which replicate once disseminated. Some of these agents are easy to hide, invisible, odorless, and can be spread silently. Besides, some biological agents are capable of surving in a variety of hosts.
From present information, according to Efstathiou S, Preston CM (2005), the mutations do not exhibit any pathology that clearly distinguishes them from persons with the other mutations. PAS A can be used by any diagnostic laboratory that can perform PCR to rapidly notice any of the known mutations. The minority of samples with an unrecognized mutation can be sent to a specialty laboratory for description of the mutation by direct genomic sequencing. The presently described combination of methods may have extensive utility in the analysis of genetic disease.
Work cited
Efstathiou S, Preston CM. Towards an understanding of the molecular basis of herpes simplex virus latency Virus Res. 2005; 111: 108-19
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus infection in organ transplant recipients-Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 2005. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2005; 54: 537-39.
William Dudley, Biological warfare Greenhaven press (2004) Pennsylvania State University.
